learnteach: (helmhead)
learnteach ([personal profile] learnteach) wrote2006-02-02 11:37 am

Unreasonable

It seems to me that in many relationships, that being unreasonable wins and is a good strategy, mathematically speaking.

This comes to me after reading about the threats to all westerners by gun carrying men in the Gaza, who claim that they are insulted because a few European papers printed a charicature of their religous figure. Now it's all over the news, and they're rioting in the streets.

In the matters of the various political moves in America, it seems unreasonable to me to use the rules to get your way--but that's the way the game is now playes.

Reasonable...what does it mean? It means to do the expected thing, the polite thing, the thing you're told to do as a child. Not to throw bottles onto the roller derby arena. Not to scream at people to get your way, or to treat them as your lessors.

But it's a tactic that works, because those who avoid challenge will think thrice before going up against your unreasonable position. And those who think of a chivalrous response--my definition of chivalry being that you respond at the appropriate level to the insult--are horrified.

Armed gunmen in the street being threatening? Arrest them with force and jail them. But they lose nothing (because they have nothing, but their lives, a community that is willing to expend them, and a gun. Also...the knowledge that they will gain respect. And what else?

In my personal life, being reasonable makes me easier to get along with. But not, I think, as much fun, nor as true to myself.

This week, I will be less reasonable.

Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

[identity profile] terpsichoros.livejournal.com 2006-02-03 01:10 am (UTC)(link)
Robert Axelrod, in the book "The Evolution of Cooperation" found that the strongest, most stable strategy in an iterated Prisoners' Dilemma environment is "tit for tat" - essentially making there be a consequence for bad behavior, but otherwise behaving well. (Always defecting is a *stable* strategy, but a world of defectors is much poorer.

From what you're saying, and from what I've observed, in most social interaction, most people are following "nicer" strategies than tit-for-tat, which allows people with "mean" strategies to enrich themselves at the expense of others.

As far as I know, nobody has modeled the IPD in a social environment where players have knowlege of other players' interactions with other players. I suspect that the results would be similar, though.

The question is whether in a universe populated mostly by "nice" players (with "nicer" strategies than tit-for-tat), but knowlege of outside interactions and the ability to refuse interactions, how much information is required to effectively isolate "mean" players. (Model some inaccuracy of the information about other players' transaction history to make it even more realistic.)